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1.   Interdisciplinarity: A Container Concept 
 
What is interdisciplinary research? In common parlance the concept of 
interdisciplinarity is often used as a rather broad category encompassing all kinds of 
research in which two or more disciplines are brought together. From a rhetorical 
point of view, it may be observed that it has become a popular notion that helps to 
give the research at hand a sophisticated and contemporary image. At a closer look, 
it appears that various types of research can go by the name – even research that is 
actually monodisciplinary. In this chapter, we provide a model to categorize the 
different ways in which an interdisciplinary research project can be set up, mapping 
the differences according to the intensity of co-operation between the disciplines 
involved (section 2). Should you choose to take on the study of a different discipline, 
there are a number of problems you may encounter. Some of these may be obvious: 
how to read statistics without proper training, for example. Others may be more 
hidden: for instance, how to interpret familiar concepts which have a different 
meaning in another discipline. Such differences may be quite subtle and easily 
missed. We will first highlight some of the more fundamental problems of 
interdisciplinary work (section 3); specific problems related to particular disciplines 
will be addressed in the chapters discussing these disciplines in part II of the book. 
Subsequently, problems of a more practical kind will be discussed (section 4). We do 
not intend to solve these problems once and for all (even if we could) but wish you to 
be aware of them and offer some strategies of dealing with them in a pragmatic way. 
Finally, we show how a choice between the various types of interdisciplinary 
research can be made (section 5). 
 
2.  A Dynamic Model of Interdisciplinarity 
 
If we consider the ways in which a researcher may engage in interdisciplinary 
research, it becomes clear that the possibilities are numerous. In order to map the 
practice of interdisciplinary research in a systematic way, we can construct a 
dynamic model of interdisciplinarity.1 We believe a typology of research can be made 
on a scale, based on the extent of other disciplinary input in a research project. This 
means that we first need to identify the elements that determine the perspective of a 
particular discipline in order to assess how far the interdisciplinary work moves 
beyond the single discipline. 
The first, most conspicuous, feature of a discipline is the particular set of 
concepts it uses and the way these are used. Generally, core concepts of disciplines 
differ; and even if they do use similar concepts, the interpretation they give to them 
                                                  
1 The following typology owes much to discussions with Wibren van der Burg who proposes a 
similar typology (see Chapter 8). For an alternative typology, see Siems 2009. 
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will differ. The second element are the methods used by a discipline. A method can 
be described as a structured and established way of acquiring knowledge. For 
instance, in order to determine the temperature, meteorologists (as well as people in 
everyday life) use a thermometer. Although many disciplines use a variety of 
methods, there are always a few favoured methods that are characteristic of a 
discipline. Again, even if such methods are broadly shared with other disciplines, the 
way a discipline uses and develops them is distinctive. For example, textual analysis 
is a core method for legal scholars and literary scholars alike, but the actual 
analyses, in practice, are very different. Whereas literary scholars often compete to 
find the most original interpretation, legal scholars usually aim to respect the original 
intent of the law drafters as much as possible. Some of these differences derive from 
other elements that characterize a discipline. The third element is the object of the 
discipline: the aspect of reality or experience that is studied. For some disciplines, the 
object is the clearest indicator of the boundaries of the discipline; think of astronomy 
or archaeology. For other disciplines, however, the character or scope of the object is 
contested, law being among these. Legal scholars differ fundamentally on the issue 
what exactly they are studying. The fourth element is what we would like to call the 
problem awareness of a discipline and the resulting problem definitions. Different 
disciplines perceive different problems. This also explains the different approaches to 
the same basic object; for example, the human body as an object of research is 
approached differently by biology, medicine or anthropology. A medical scholar may 
be interested to find the cause of a disease, for which purpose she has to make an 
internal investigation of the body. An anthropologist, on the other hand, is not 
interested in physical processes but in reasons why people in a particular group deal 
with sickness and death the way they do (e.g., why they have certain rituals for 
caring and burying). In this case, it is more relevant to observe outward behaviour 
and ask people about their inner motives. The fifth element is the research goal or 
goals pursued by a discipline. A common distinction is that between descriptive and 
evaluative research: aiming at a correct description or explanation of a phenomenon 
or aiming at a normative evaluation. This distinction is often cited as a distinguishing 
feature between legal science and sociology of law, but it is also relevant to 
differentiate between other types of research, such as fundamental research in 
artificial intelligence, aiming at an explanation of computer processes, and applied 
information science, aiming at evaluation or improvement of software applications. To 
take law and sociology as an example: both sociologists and lawyers take law as an 
object of research, but sociologists claim to do no more than describe how the legal 
system works in reality, while lawyers evaluate the legal system in terms of legality, 
appropriateness, or coherence.2 Moreover, disciplines or different approaches within 
a discipline may also differ with respect to the goal or goals connected to the 
description or evaluation. For instance, a socio-legal description of court proceedings 
may aim at understanding the inner motives of the legal actors involved or at 
                                                  
2 Although this is a common way of describing the difference, not everyone agrees. There are 
sociologists (e.g., Selznick) who also think it is their task to evaluate (especially the success 
of law in coping with societal problems, see for instance Selznick 1992) and there are lawyers 
who think their main task is the description of legal norms (e.g., Kelsen 1992). Some may also 
argue that the difference between sociologists and lawyers is a difference in object: looking at 
social facts versus legal norms. We will return to the different views on these topics in the 
next section. 
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explaining their overt behaviour. Similarly, evaluation of an existing legal rule may be 
done for the purpose of improving the rule.3 We will return to the issues of 
explanation versus understanding and fundamental and applied research in the next 
section.  
The five characteristics of an academic discipline enumerated here are not 
the only characteristics that form disciplines. These five are characteristics that are 
important from the perspective of one’s philosophy of science; they are 
characteristics that become apparent when you ask yourself how the concept of a 
discipline is related to the concept of scientific research. In addition, a common way 
of understanding a discipline is from the perspective of the sociology of science. 
Sociologically, disciplines are characterised by the interactions of the groups of 
people engaged in the discipline, e.g. by the way newcomers are educated and 
socialised into the norms of the group, or by the hierarchy within research 
organisations such as university departments (which are often organised along 
disciplinary lines) and the pressures that arise from such organisational hierarchies.4 
In this chapter we will put the emphasis on the philosophical characterisation of 
disciplines –  in terms of the concepts used, the applied methods, the goals pursued 
and so on (as opposed to the discipline’s social organisation) – because those 
characteristics are closely related to the theoretical problems of interdisciplinary 
research. 
Using the five determining elements explained above, we can describe 
different types of interdisciplinary legal research as moving from a monodisciplinary 
towards a fully integrated interdisciplinary perspective. The most important issues 
arising in the practice of interdisciplinary research relate to the problem definition (Is 
there a collaboration between disciplines on the problem definition?) and to the 
concepts and methods of the different disciplines (How is the research itself 
conducted?). Research combining different disciplines is often referred to as 
multidisciplinary research. In the following, the first three types can be grouped 
together under the heading of multidisciplinary research, by which we mean research 
combining disciplines in some way, without aiming at integration. We cannot avoid 
using the term interdisciplinarity in two ways: broadly, to refer to any type of research that 
involves another discipline in some way, and narrowly, to refer to research that achieves 
genuine interaction between the combined disciplines. Our model is a model of 
interdisciplinarity in a broad sense, types 4 and 5 in the model are interdisciplinary in a 
narrow sense. 
 
TYPE 1: HEURISTIC 
The first type of legal research that moves beyond the discipline of law is research 
that uses other disciplines heuristically. In such research the legal discipline provides 
the problem definition, but the researcher looks for useful material or ideas in another 
discipline. Once relevant material is found, the researcher incorporates that material 
in a legal argument. The other discipline is used only as a source of argument or 
inspiration. An example of this type is the way great books are often used in law and 
                                                  
3 For a typology of research goals, see IJzermans & Van Schaaijk 2007, p. 19-20.  
4 Most of the authors discussing interdisciplinarity use both philosophical and sociological 
criteria to characterise disciplines, see e.g. Balkin (1996, 954-957) and Vick (2004, 166-170). 
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literature research by lawyers.5 A lawyer might use Bleak House by Charles Dickens 
to argue that legal procedures have an alienating effect on ordinary people. In itself, 
the claim distilled from the novel is not a valid argument in legal research: such a 
claim would still need to be justified within the discipline of law, on the basis of 
recognizable legal concepts, to be recognized as a legal argument. For the heuristic 
type the perspective of the research as a whole remains within the legal framework.  
 
TYPE 2: AUXILIARY 
The second type of legal research uses other disciplines as auxiliary disciplines. The 
legal researcher defines a problem, which he cannot solve with legal methods only, 
so that there is a need for input from another discipline. Often there will be a reason 
for that problem, external to the legal framework, which is perceived as demanding a 
legal response. In this type of research, material derived from the other discipline 
serves as a necessary contribution to the legal arguments. The validity of the 
contributing argument is not determined in terms of the legal discipline only: it needs 
to be a valid argument within the auxiliary discipline itself. This type is exemplified by 
research that uses material from an empirical science. For instance, research in 
environmental law may use biological research to argue for the protection of 
ecosystems instead of the protection of separate species in legislation. In order to 
make valid use of that argument within law, the interdependence of species within 
ecosystems needs to be an accepted view within the field of biology. However, the 
conclusions of such research are still legal conclusions. They will concern the 
regulation of ecosystem protection, and they will not include independent claims on 
the biological issue of ecosystems. The research from the auxiliary discipline is only 
one element in a larger legal framework.  
 
TYPE 3: COMPARATIVE 
The third type of research is comparative, treating two disciplines as equally 
important perspectives. In this form of multidisciplinary research, each of the 
disciplines provides a definition of the central problem. There is no dominant 
perspective, and the core of such research is a comparative study of the two 
disciplines, in which the confrontation with the other discipline yields new insights for 
both. This type can be best understood by using the parallel of comparative law. 
According to radical theorists of comparative law, such as that of Pierre Legrand, 
comparing entails immersing oneself in the cultures of both legal systems (Legrand 
2003). The perspective of a whole legal culture, or in our case, a whole discipline, 
needs to be included in order to make an even comparison between two disciplines 
possible. In this type of research, the whole research process is doubled: from 
problem definition to conclusion, the two disciplines work within their own terms. 
Such multidisciplinary research is an attractive model if a research group with 
participants from different disciplines can be formed: each researcher brings in a 
complete disciplinary framework and has a primary interest in justifying the research 
project in his own terms.  
 
                                                  
5 This is not true of all law and literature research; most researchers are much more 
ambitious. Our point here is that in practice, if you look closely at the uses made of canonical 
books, it appears that many legal researchers do not achieve more than a heuristic use of 
literature. 
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TYPE 4: PERSPECTIVIST  
Both the fourth and fifth type, perspectivist and integrated interdisciplinary6 research, 
then move from the side-by-side comparison towards integration of perspectives. 
Primarily, this means that interdisciplinary research starts with a joint problem 
definition and ends with a conclusion that is justified for both disciplines. However, to 
what extent the whole research process can be integrated is debatable. Of the 
theorists who think interdisciplinary research is possible, not everyone has the same 
view of the extent to which interdisciplinarity can be achieved.  
 
TYPE 4A: PERSPECTIVIST 
First, we may distinguish interdisciplinary research as perspectivist.7 Such research 
switches between two disciplines, using the concepts and methods of each. The 
conclusions will also be perspectivist: there is not a coherent single answer, but a 
necessary co-existence of two disciplines. Neither discipline can provide the whole 
answer, nor can the disciplines give up their own framework. An example of 
perspectivist research is the research into violence by Kees Schuyt (Schuyt 2003, p. 
87-89). Schuyt argues that violence has been studied extensively from a 
monodisciplinary point of view, but cannot be completely understood either from a 
psychological, a sociological or an anthropological perspective. All three disciplines, 
and more, are necessary for a complete understanding. Schuyt proposes a 
theoretical framework in which each discipline has its place: ranging from the 
explanation by personal factors to intercultural factors. A switch in perspective seems 
necessary to move from one layer in the framework to the next. 
 
TYPE 5: INTEGRATED 
Secondly, interdisciplinary research can be seen as integrated interdisciplinary 
research. In this case, the research process itself contains elements from both 
disciplines and the researcher welds together the concepts and methods from each 
or applies a more general methodological approach to both. Application of the 
general methods of hermeneutics to both law and philosophy might serve as an 
example of the latter. An example of the integration of elements from two disciplines 
may be found in James Boyd White’s research in law and literature. He brings 
together concepts and methods from the legal and the literary perspective to create a 
new approach to both legal and literary texts.  
Although integrated interdisciplinary research is the most extensive form of 
combining disciplines in research, we may question whether this type of research 
remains interdisciplinary.8 This is one of the main reasons why the model is a 
dynamic model: the practice of research moves on and the relationships between 
disciplines change continually. If we look at historical developments of scientific 
disciplines, it becomes apparent that these are not stable. At times, a segment of an 
existing discipline may branch off to form a new one as, for example, psychology 
separated from philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century. The result of 
integrated interdisciplinary research may also be the birth of a new discipline. For 
                                                  
6 Here, we use the term interdisciplinary in a narrow sense . 
7 The idea of perspectivism is explained by Van der Burg (2009, p. 2). 
8 Some theorists, like J.M. Balkin, deny that integrated interdisciplinary research is possible. 
Balkin (1996) sees the dynamic of disciplines as a move from a supporting relationship to a 
change of the discipline or possibly the formation of a new discipline. 
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instance, we may argue that history of law and sociology of law have developed 
concepts and methods that are their own and can therefore be regarded as new 
specialized disciplines. Such a development not only takes time, but also requires a 
favourable institutional setting: there needs to be a substantial group of people 
working in the field, support from academic organizations, and so on. For many other 
fields of interdisciplinary research, the question at this point in time is whether the 
conditions are favourable for the development towards a new discipline. In some 
instances, it seems that combining law with another discipline does not move 
towards integration, but slides into a subordination of law to the other discipline.9 For 
instance, arguably, certain branches of law and economics research merely use law 
as input for economic research and deliver conclusions that remain alien to the legal 
field; for instance by requiring that the legal system should be more efficient. Here, 
the result of the dynamic of interdisciplinary research may be a position for law as a 
supporting discipline. 
 
 
3.  Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research: Matters of 
Principle 
 
In the description of the fourth and fifth type of interdisciplinary research in a narrow 
sense, we have already indicated that the extent to which interdisciplinary research is 
deemed possible depends upon one’s view of disciplinarity and one’s 
characterization of the closed or open nature of law as a discipline. In this section, we 
discuss some of the major theoretical issues that arise in the context of the different 
types of interdisciplinary research. For these issues no easy solutions are available. 
Since they touch on fundamental convictions about the nature and purpose of 
science, different scholars will inevitably have different views on these matters.  We 
focus on five controversial issues: 
A. How to distinguish between true and false statements? 
B. Does science have to aim at explaining or at understanding phenomena?  
C. Can facts and values be separated?  
D. Is it possible to transfer concepts from one discipline to another? 
E. Is science a quest for knowledge for its own sake or must it be socially 
relevant?  
After having presented these issues, we will give some practical guidelines how to 
deal with them. We do not intend (or hope) to solve these matters once and for all.  
 
A.  TRUTH 
Many of the discussions about the possibility of interdisciplinary research stem from 
the divergence of views on what academic disciplines are. The narrower a discipline 
is defined, the more impenetrable the boundaries between disciplines become. 
Moreover, a particular conception of a scientific discipline is tied to an idea of what 
science is about, what true knowledge is, in short, to a philosophy of science. In 
different disciplines different views prevail. Consequently, while performing multi- or 
interdisciplinary research, you may encounter the problem that you have to ‘prove’ 
your claims according to different, possibly incompatible, notions of truth. In other 
                                                  
9 A phenomenon that resembles what Balkin (1996, 960-961) refers to as colonization. 
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words, how can you convince scholars from other disciplines that what you are 
saying is true?  
 In the philosophy of science, the notion of truth is one of the perennial 
problems. We easily say that the common goal of all scientific research is to add to 
the body of knowledge. But what is knowledge? How do you know whether a 
scientific statement of fact or a theory is true? There is an enormous range of 
theories about truth, from a Platonic world of true ideas to a relativistic notion of truth 
as a cultural construct. However, we can make a rough distinction in modern theories 
of truth between correspondence theories and coherence theories.10  
Correspondence theories of truth reflect our daily, uninformed notion of truth 
as corresponding to reality. A statement is true if it correctly reflects the facts in the 
world.11 The truth of a scientific theory is then determined by checking whether it fits 
the facts. Coherence theories of truth start at the other end: a statement is true if it 
does not contradict and is substantially in accordance with the widest possible range 
of other statements. Coherence theories do not pronounce a direct verdict on the 
reality of the world ‘out there’ but use both factual and theoretical beliefs as the basic 
input.12 The reason to adhere to a coherence theory is that it has proven immensely 
difficult to determine what reality is. A correspondence theory needs to define reality, 
but our only access to reality is through our own observations and calculations. In a 
sense, you can never know for sure what is real. On the other hand, it seems strange 
to let go of all reference to the real world. Intuitively, there is an immense difference 
between the statement of fact that a person is dead, when you can observe that the 
body of that person is cold and no longer breathing, or the statement of a legal theory 
of criminal intent (mens rea), the idea that in order to be guilty of a crime someone 
must at some time have possessed the mental element of intention to commit the 
crime. The first statement seems verifiable, while the second cannot really be proven. 
There are different solutions for acknowledging such differences. One is by regarding 
both facts and theories as provisionally true: we may assume that a statement is true 
as long as it is not proven to be false.13 Another solution is to combine elements of 
coherence and correspondence theories in a pragmatic way: without actually 
claiming that factual beliefs correspond to a given reality, one can treat the 
coherence of those beliefs with each other and with other beliefs as a sign that there 
is good reason to believe in such a reality.14  
Whether you need to take a thoroughly argued position on issues of truth very 
much depends on its relevance to your research; it is more important when you 
conduct experiments than when you devise a theory on the principles of legality. You 
should, however, be careful not to claim too easily that your conclusions are 
                                                  
10 For accessible introductions, see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(plato.stanford.edu).  
11 This view is usually attributed to Russell and Moore. Russell simply defined truth as follows 
“Thus a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no 
corresponding fact” (1980, 75). 
12 An influential coherence theory in practical philosophy is the theory of reflective equilibrium, 
first developed by John Rawls (see Daniels 1980). 
13 This is the basis of Popper’s theory of science, which still informs many of the models of 
science used today, although Popper’s theory is not a theory of truth strictly speaking. 
Popper’s so-called falsificationism holds that a scientist should devise hypotheses in such a 
way that they can be falsified, i.e. proven not to be true. As long as you do not succeed in 
disproving the hypothesis by observation or experiment, it can be regarded as true.  
14 E.g. the theory of Donald Davidson (1990). 
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supported by facts. The problem of truth will often be concealed in problems of how 
to gather information and how to draw conclusions from that information, in short in 
methodological problems. How to deal with these, practically, is the subject of section 
4. We continue here with another basic distinction underlying methodological 
choices. 
 
B.  EXPLANATION vs. UNDERSTANDING 
The distinction between explanation and understanding is usually referred to in 
German as the distinction between Erklären (explanation) and Verstehen 
(understanding). It was first used to indicate the difference between natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften) and humanities (Geisteswissenschaften); currently, it is 
commonly associated with the difference between positivism and hermeneutics as 
scientific approaches. The latter distinction largely parallels a distinction between 
research into causes of events and research into reasons for conduct. Natural 
sciences are concerned with the explanation of certain phenomena while humanities 
try to make sense of human behaviour and thought. In physics, laws of mechanics 
were formulated to explain movement of objects, while in history reasons were 
formulated to understand the meaning of human acts such as wars and revolutions. 
 The above distinction is especially relevant for understanding debates in 
social science, where some scientists declare that the goal of social science should 
be to explain observable behaviour, while others declare that its goal should be to 
understand behaviour and thought, more broadly. The distinction is also the basis for 
a choice of research methods: for instance, psychological experiments are done to 
find the causes of human behaviour, while anthropological participatory observation 
is done to understand the meaning of social practices. Significantly, therefore, if you 
are combining disciplines, you may find that they not only have different views on the 
central goal of scientific research but also on the methods to be used to attain this 
goal. Which method should you use? 
The choice of methods partly correlates with a view of the proper approach of 
social phenomena.15 In the positivistic approach, scientists should only deal with 
observable behaviour and exclude from their research the (subjective) meaning 
people attribute to their own and others’ behaviour. In the hermeneutic approach, 
scientists ought to incorporate the subjective views people have as an integral part of 
the phenomenon that needs to be understood. For positivistic (or behaviouristic) 
researchers, trying to give meaning to a social phenomenon amounts to bad science: 
you can only give your own interpretation of the personal experiences of people. 
Studying observable behaviour is seen as more objective; it is research that can be 
replicated and checked. In hermeneutics, researchers are fully aware of the 
subjective component in their research, but they see that as an inevitable component 
of the enterprise of research that can be minimised (but not overcome) by explication 
and argumentation. They see behaviouristic research as shallow and incomplete: 
how can you claim to know anything about people without addressing their self-
understanding? Hermeneutics was first developed as an approach for text-based 
research, such as philosophy, theology and literature, for which it is still an influential 
approach.16 Subsequently, hermeneutic methods were designed for studying and 
                                                  
15 Compare Chapter 3, Section 3 on research paradigms. 
16 In philosophy, the major proponent of hermeneutics is Gadamer (1994). 
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understanding human behaviour and its significance, such as the idea of ‘thick 
description’ in the interpretive anthropology of Clifford Geertz (1973). In order to 
understand why a person acted the way he did, you have to imagine yourself in his or 
her position.   
  
C.  FACT/VALUE SEPARATION 
Another distinction that may be used to differentiate between different types of 
scientific research is that between fact and value. According to some scholars, a 
distinction can be drawn between empirical sciences that are concerned with facts on 
the one hand and normative disciplines that deal with values on the other hand. 
Empirical sciences, among which the natural sciences, observe how things are; 
whereas, normative sciences such as ethics and legal scholarship, are concerned 
with how things should be. Disciplines belonging to the humanities can be placed on 
either side of the spectrum: for example, history and linguistics can be considered as 
empirical sciences because they describe factual events and language rules 
respectively; theology, on the other hand, is predominantly a normative science since 
it prescribes how people ought to behave according to rules and principles extracted 
from the Bible (or other holy texts). The same applies to the social sciences, 
dependent on whether the emphasis is laid on factual description (as in psychological 
research) or evaluation (as in gender studies). It is important for legal scholars 
engaged in multi- or interdisciplinary research to be aware of this distinction, as well 
as the debate it caused because, among other things, it is not obvious that normative 
claims can be drawn from empirical data. For example, it does not necessarily follow 
from the fact that a certain legal procedure is not efficient that the procedure has to 
be changed; there can be other reasons to keep it as it is, reasons of fairness for 
example. 
In one of the first academic debates on the limits and possibilities of 
interdisciplinary research into law,17 Hans Kelsen accuses Eugen Ehrlich of fusing 
empirical and normative statements about the law. In his ‘pure’ theory of law, Kelsen 
tries to construe a solid scientific foundation for the science of law in order to secure 
its position among other sciences, in particular natural science (which continues to be 
the generally accepted prototype for ‘true’ science18). In that vein the question to be 
answered is what is typical or unique about the way the science of law understands 
its object and how it differs from other ways of understanding. Kelsen argues that the 
phenomenon of law can be studied from two different perspectives: either how it 
should be (Sollen) or how it is (Sein). These two perspectives correspond with two 
different disciplines from which law can be studied: respectively, a normative science 
of law that determines deductively which rules are valid, and an explanatory 
sociology of law that establish inductively a certain regularity for which it tries to find a 
causal explanation. Thus, in Kelsen’s view, the science of law is a normative and 
deductive science of value, like ethics and logics, whereas the sociology of law, like 
other branches of sociology, is a science of reality, and conforms more generally to 
the methodological practices of the natural sciences. It is equally possible and 
legitimate to study law from both perspectives, but not at the same time.  
                                                  
17 See Ehrlich & Kelsen (2003), discussed by Van Klink (2008). 
18 Newspapers that publish scientific new on a regular basis, tend to focus on the supposedly 
harder sciences, such as chemistry, biology and archeology, at the cost of the humanities.  
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 This strict fact-value separation is rejected by scholars adhering to other, non-
positivist scientific approaches, in particular hermeneutics and pragmatism. A forceful 
pragmatist defense of the inseparability of facts and values is provided by Hilary 
Putnam. According to him, knowledge of facts presumes knowledge of values and, 
vice versa, knowledge of values presumes knowledge of facts (Putnam 1995, 14). 
There is no neat division between the factual characterization of behaviour ─ ‘what 
you just did was rude’─ and evaluation of that behaviour ─ ‘being rude is bad’ 
(Putnam 2002, 36). This view derives from the basic pragmatist presumption that we 
find ourselves in the middle of our own experience, in the middle of a world in which 
fact and value, natural and social factors, humans and other beings are not distinct 
nor neatly categorized (Dewey 1989, 352). Although we can in principle distinguish 
factual judgments from evaluative judgments, many of those judgments are mixed 
and there is not a clear separating line between the two categories. In his 
hermeneutic philosophy of law, Ronald Dworkin also rejects a strict fact/value 
distinction. According to him, statements about what the law is have both a factual 
and an evaluative dimension because they have to fit the existing system of law and 
present it in the most attractive way at the same time (Dworkin 1986, 230-231). 
 
D.   TRANSLATABILITY OF CONCEPTS 
Every discipline has its own specific vocabulary to describe, explain and/or evaluate 
the phenomena that it is investigating. Different disciplines use different concepts and 
it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to transfer concepts from one discipline to 
another. Concepts that are current in one discipline do not always make sense in 
another discipline. For instance, it would be very odd for legal scholars to analyze the 
law in terms of its linguistic categories, as linguists would do, or to describe the 
legislative process as a ‘ritual’, as anthropologists might do. Conversely, medical 
scholars have no use for legal notions such as ‘ownership’ or ‘property right’, when 
analyzing human bodies. If it is possible to transfer concepts, the concepts involved 
may acquire a new meaning in the target domain that differs from the meaning they 
originally had. Even when no explicit transfer has taken place, different disciplines 
may understand the same (or similar) concepts in very different ways. In linguistics, 
this is called the problem of false friends: concepts may look similar, but in fact they 
mean something else. In English, for example, ‘gift’ means ‘present’, whereas in 
German it means ‘poison’ and in Dutch it can be both. Likewise, legal scholars and 
sociologists may have very different understandings of validity: a legal norm is called 
‘valid’ in the traditional juridical sense, when it is created in a lawful way and in 
accordance with higher legal norms. For sociologists, however, this is usually not 
enough: a legal norm must be applied and obeyed to in society in order to be valid in 
the sociological sense; otherwise it is just a rule on paper.19 Therefore, every scholar 
who is involved in multi- or interdisciplinary research has to be very careful when 
transferring concepts.       
 Roughly speaking, there are two ways of looking at the translatability issue, 
either from a realist or from a nominalist point of view. In a realist perception, 
concepts refer to objects or entities that exist in real life.20 Words and things are 
essentially connected and, therefore, concepts are not easily interchangeable or 
                                                  
19 See the Ehrlich-Kelsen debate mentioned above. 
20 For a contemporary contribution to the realism debate, see Douven & Horsten (1996).  
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transferable from one domain to another. Different words denote different things and 
if, by accident, the same concept is used in different domains we must check 
carefully whether it is really the same thing that is being referred to. In a nominalist 
view, on the contrary, concepts are seen as mere constructions, that is conventional 
and convenient ways of expression (see, e.g., De Saussure 1972). Since there is no 
essential connection between words and things, we may use different words for the 
same thing or the same word for different things. Although a realist view does not 
completely rule out the possibility of exchanging concepts between disciplines, it 
does impose a strict limitation: concepts can only be transferred if we can be sure 
that in reality it is the same thing that we are talking about. Nominalism, which 
certainly in the humanities is the dominant view, seems to allow for a more liberal 
border politics between disciplines. However, it must also recognize some limits to 
the exchange of concepts. In particular, basic (linguistic and other) conventions have 
to be respected in order to avoid conceptual confusion. When a discipline only 
focuses on outward behaviour (like behaviourism in the social sciences) it begs the 
question of invoking notions which refer to mental states, such as consciousness, 
motives and intentions.        
 
E.  FUNDAMENTAL vs. APPLIED RESEARCH 
Finally, controversy may arise around the question whether scientific research should 
be fundamental or applied. Fundamental research is concerned with the quest for 
knowledge for its own sake, without having to worry too much about its practical 
relevance. In applied research, knowledge is acquired and used for the benefit of 
society. Some disciplines carry out either fundamental research (such as 
mathematics, archeology and history) or applied research (disciplines that focus on a 
specific theme related to policy issues, such as public administration, business 
administration or environmental studies), while others show a mixture of both (such 
as medicine, biology and ethics). The science of law belongs to the latter category, 
but the practical and fundamental approaches do not always live peacefully together. 
Traditionally, legal scholars consider it to be one of their main tasks to inform legal 
practitioners about the content of the law and to comment on new drafts and court 
decisions. However, some legal scholars have recently claimed21 that this practical 
orientation has hindered the study of law in becoming a ‘real’ science. As a defense, 
it has been argued that there is no point in carrying out legal research without any 
apparent practical relevance.  
In connection with this issue the question has been raised whether legal 
research should engage in the critical activity of challenging the powers that be and 
supporting the less powerful – such as women, black, indigenous or handicapped 
people, refugees and so on – in their fight for political and legal recognition. In the 
Marxist tradition, a distinction is drawn between traditional and critical theory: 
whereas traditional theory sustains the existing power structure in society (that is, the 
status quo), critical theory is designed “to liberate human beings from the 
                                                  
21 In the Netherlands, a Commission chaired by Jan Smits published a report entitled 
Towards Key Performance Indicators for Scientific Legal Research (Naar prestatie-
indicatoren voor rechtswetenschappelijk onderzoek), VSNU 2007, available at: 
http://english.vsnu.nl/web/show/id=98846/framenoid=39657/langid=43. 
 
 12
circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer 1982, 244).22 In gender studies, court 
decisions and statutes are analyzed critically in order to reveal and undermine the 
gender bias of the law as it is which supposedly favours men at the cost of women 
and other people who do not fit the dominant ‘white male standard’ (see, e.g., Butler 
1999). According to the so-called traditionalists, critical theory is nothing but political 
activism under the pretext of science.  
The academic debate on the aims of legal research (and academic research 
in general) is highly influenced by the way academic research is funded by national 
governments nowadays. Due to the fact that faculties of law have to increasingly rely 
on “contract” research, legal research is becoming more practice-oriented and 
applied. In contract research, the contractor or ‘client’ (for instance, a ministry or a 
municipality) hires legal scholars to answer some questions that have arisen in legal 
or political practice. Thus, the research agenda – including the research questions to 
be addressed and sometimes even the possible answers – is to a great extent 
determined by people from outside the academic world. Notably, some legal scholars 
welcome contract research, because it increases the practical relevance of legal 
research. Moreover, they generally reject a strict separation between fundamental 
and applied research. In the ideal case, both types of research reinforce each other: 
applied research cannot be carried without a solid theoretical foundation, while the 
theoretical presuppositions underlying fundamental research are tested by applying 
them to practical issues. Other scholars, however, consider this development to be a 
serious threat for the independence and academic quality of scientific research (see 
also Chapter 2, Section 2).  
    
When doing multi- or interdisciplinary research you can easily encounter one or more 
of these fundamental issues. In discussions on the reliability of evidence in penal 
cases, for instance, scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds appeal to 
different notions of truth: psychologists tend to demand empirical evidence for the 
reliability of testimonies, whereas most legal scholars and practicing lawyers are 
satisfied with probability based on common sense. People who have experience in 
working in research groups composed of people from various disciplines, know how 
difficult it can be to reach a shared understanding of the basic concepts of their 
research programme (if it succeeds at all). Moreover, social scholars, trained in doing 
empirical research can experience difficulties in engaging themselves in discussions 
on normative matters. By training, they care more about facts than about values. If 
you try to combine insights from different sources in your research, you will discover 
that they are not always compatible with each other because – among other things – 
they may be based on different, factual or normative, presumptions. For example, 
when you try to import economic notions into your legal research, the question arises 
whether they are relevant for understanding and evaluating the law. Does law have 
to provide for the most efficient solution? And how does the economic value of 
efficiency relate to legal principles such as equality and legal security? Another 
source of incompatibility may be that different disciplines highlight different aspects of 
the same phenomenon. Traditional legal research focuses on the content of legal 
norms and the systemic interconnection between legal norms, whereas the sociology 
of law deals with the way they affect social life.  
                                                  
22 See also Chapter 3, Section 3 on the research paradigm of critical realism.  
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 What is the best way of dealing with these issues? Multi- and interdisciplinary 
research will always raise fundamental questions on the nature of scientific research. 
This does not mean, however, that every individual researcher has to answer these 
questions. The need to confront them depends on the particular project in which you 
engage. However, there are some general guidelines. First of all it is important that 
you are as clear and explicit as possible on the choices you have made. For 
instance, if you want to assess legal evidence, you should clarify on the basis of 
which standards you establish the truth of certain data (such as witness testimonies). 
Moreover, you should explain why these standards, in your opinion, are better suited 
for assessing legal data than other standards, which may be derived from a different 
notion of truth. The same applies to the method (or methods) that you use: describe 
your method and justify why this method, in your view, is the most fitting for 
answering your research question. It is also important that you define the basic 
concepts of your research as precisely as possible and that you show how your 
understanding of the concepts relate to other understandings in other relevant 
disciplines. Furthermore, you should clarify the aim or aims of your research: do you 
intent to carry out fundamental or applied research, or a combination of both? Finally, 
you should avoid becoming too much entangled in philosophical matters. Sometimes 
there are fundamental issues at stake on a theoretical level but in practice the 
consequences of one choice over the other are not always that fundamental. For 
instance, though realism and nominalism may differ fundamentally in their view on 
the translatability of concepts (both on a theoretical level and in concrete cases) both 
positions require that you clarify your basic concepts. Other times there seems to be 
a fundamental issue at stake, but at a second glance it appears that different 
disciplines are focusing on different aspects of the same phenomenon, so what they 
are claiming does not always have to be incompatible.  
 
 
4.  Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research: Matters of 
Practice 
 
After having discussed some matters of principle that may arise in multi- or 
interdisciplinary research, we now turn to matters of a more practical nature. We will 
focus on five practical issues that are most likely to arise, especially if you are not 
acquainted with this kind of research:  
 
A. How to select the relevant discipline and how to justify your choice;  
B. How to design an interdisciplinary research question that is interesting for all 
disciplines involved; 
C. How to combine different methods;  
D. How to find relevant materials;  
E. How to interpret the materials from other disciplines.  
 
We will discuss these practical matters briefly and give some general suggestions 
how best to deal with them. 
 
A.  SELECTING THE RELEVANT DISCIPLINE(S) 
 
 14
The first question that any aspiring interdisciplinary researcher has to answer is 
which discipline to choose. Although this is a potentially difficult choice, in practice 
there are many characteristics and constraints that will partly determine your choice 
for you. The first variable is the type of interdisciplinary research relevant to the 
research project. Most researchers, working within the field of law, only come to 
include interdisciplinary research once they have determined their topic. When 
designing their research question and plan they find that they need input from 
another discipline. So, if you plan to use another discipline as a supporting discipline, 
it usually follows from your research question which discipline is relevant. For 
instance, if you are interested in the way children’s interests are taken into account in 
divorce proceedings, the question may arise in what way young children can be 
heard. Then the relevant discipline will be that of child psychology. By analysing your 
topic and by asking yourself which knowledge you need to answer your (legal) 
questions, the disciplines to be selected should present themselves to you. 
 The matter is more complicated with comparative or interdisciplinary research 
because here, the starting point is the comparison itself of two disciplines. On the 
surface, comparison makes sense: legal scholarship and theology both interpret 
authoritative  texts and therefore there may be interesting parallels to discover by 
comparing them. As stated earlier, however, for a successful multidisciplinary or 
interdisciplinary effort, it is important that the researchers involved have a good 
working knowledge of both disciplines. This can be achieved by forming a team: 
working together with a researcher from another discipline, which requires 
necessitates a good working relationship with that colleague. However, generally a 
discipline is selected through the training of the researcher himself combining the 
study of two disciplines. The advantage of this criterion of choice is clear: the 
researcher knows both disciplines equally well. For someone versed in only one 
discipline it may be somewhat demoralizing: do you need two University degrees to 
do interdisciplinary work? If you are serious about a project, it is never too late to 
learn: why not take up a new discipline?  
 
B.  DESIGNING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
As with the previous topic, how to design the research question is dependent upon 
the type of research. Starting with auxiliary disciplines; here, it is vital that you, as a 
legal scholar, formulate precisely what you need from the other discipline. With a 
precise question, it is easier to interpret the materials you find in such a way that they 
actually provide an answer. One big problem of interdisciplinary research is that the 
kinds of questions asked in other disciplines are usually very different (see heading 
E) and need to be reinterpreted from a legal framework. Having a clear focus from 
the beginning is helpful. For instance, if you are interested in alternative dispute 
resolution in international business, you might formulate the following question. Is 
ADR a more efficient way to solve conflicts in international business relations than 
traditional court proceedings? You need to be precise about the concepts you use: 
what do you mean by solving conflicts? How do you define ADR? What counts as 
efficiency? However, although precision is important, you also need flexibility. This 
means that you should be able to rephrase your question in such a way that it 
becomes intelligible for another discipline. In this example, you may want to use 
economics as the auxiliary discipline, and you need to use economic definitions of 
efficiency in order to obtain answers. Once you have designed the question and read 
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some basic work in the other discipline, use that basic knowledge to turn your 
specific query for the auxiliary discipline into something for which you can find 
answers. 
In the case of comparative and interdisciplinary research, designing the 
research question needs to be tackled from both disciplines at once (or alternating 
between them). The challenge is to find a question that is equally interesting from 
both perspectives in the sense that it will yield new insights for both disciplines. This 
means you have to test your question by confronting it with existing literature in both 
fields: does the question tackle a new issue? It is the potential strength of 
interdisciplinary research that it provides genuinely new questions and answers, but it 
is important to check whether this is really the case in both disciplines. Here, it is 
again particularly important to be clear about the meaning of concepts: do not 
assume too quickly that the question means the same thing in both fields. 
 
C.  COMBINING METHODS 
Multi- and interdisciplinary research inevitably involve the use of different methods. 
For instance, if you want to add an empirical angle to your legal research, you cannot 
restrict yourself to a textual analysis of legal sources only. You have to start an 
investigation into reality, either by collecting empirical data yourself of by referring to 
the results of previous empirical research, carried out by other scholars. If you want 
to do the research yourself, you have to find, to begin with, the right method or 
methods to collect empirical data (you can, for instance, interview people or send out 
a questionnaire) and, subsequently, you have to apply this method or these methods 
in the right way. This requires an intensive training in the methodology of social 
sciences. If you are not willing or capable of doing the research yourself and 
therefore have to refer to empirical data collected by others instead, the problem is to 
find the right materials and to interpret them in the right way, which will be discussed 
below under the headings D and E respectively.  
Either way, the question will arise how to combine the different methods and 
the different results they generate. Moving through the different stages of our 
dynamic model of interdisciplinarity – from a heuristic use of another discipline to a 
fully integrated interdisciplinary approach (as described in section 2) –, you will 
discover that this question becomes more and more urgent. If you simply seek 
inspiration from another discipline (for instance, literature studies), you have to 
translate your findings into legal terms and justify them according to the standards 
accepted in the science of law. A story like Von Kleist’s ‘Michael Kohlhaas’ may 
inspire you to criticize the legal system, but you must give independent legal 
arguments in order to support your criticism. If another discipline is needed to provide 
information that is not available in the science of law, for instance information about 
the actual effects of legislation, you have to justify why this information is really 
necessary. Why do legal scholars have to know about the effects of law? Moreover, 
you should clarify how the extra-legal information is incorporated with the existing 
body of legal knowledge. How does it relate to other information already available in 
the science of law? For instance, how is law’s effectiveness weighed against legal 
standards such as equality and fairness? The same applies to comparative  research 
and, to an even greater extent, to perspectivist interdisciplinary research because 
here the exchange between disciplines is not incidental (to fill a specific gap in our 
knowledge) but structural (an object is studied systematically from different 
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perspectives): the combination of insights from different sources has to be justified. 
What do we gain as scholars of law from consulting economics or psychology, for 
instance? Finally,  fully integrative interdisciplinary research requires an integration of 
methods: methods originally belonging to separate disciplines which are brought 
together in order to investigate an object. For instance, information science uses a 
variety of methods including mathematics, cognitive science and communication 
studies. To secure the unity of its object (in this case: information), an integrative 
approach requires an overarching method, or ‘meta-method’, which clarifies the 
relation between the different methods to be used and the way in which they can be 
brought together in answering the central research questions. If the integration of 
methods is successful and, on the basis thereof, a stable research program is 
established, the interdisciplinary approach turns into a discipline in its own right. 
 
 
D.  FINDING MATERIALS 
It is very hard to find your way in a new discipline. Where should you start and what 
should you read? Of course, you could consult the library and get all the books and 
articles available on a particular topic in a particular field of research. Most likely, you 
will end up with an enormous pile of literature, not knowing which publications are 
relevant, so this is not very efficient. A better way to start is to consult experts who 
can give you suggestions for relevant publications to read and relevant courses to 
follow. For that purpose, it is very important that you make as clear as possible what 
it is that you are looking for; otherwise you will not get any suitable 
recommendations. If you are exploring totally foreign territory, it is best to start with 
some recent handbooks that give an overview of the discipline at hand – the topics it 
investigates, the different approaches which it consists of, the methods it uses and 
the results that have been achieved so far. After having read the following chapters, 
you probably will have a good picture of the different disciplines and their 
perspectives and methods. As soon as you have a general idea of what a discipline 
is about, you can move on to more specific publications which focus on the topic 
which you are particularly interested in. In these publications you will find references 
to further relevant literature. Another strategy is to follow introductory courses: you 
will get a quick overview of a discipline and, moreover, it will give you the opportunity 
to consult experts.  
 
E.  INTERPRETING MATERIALS 
When you have found the relevant materials, you have to read and interpret them. 
That means that you have to process the information that is provided in the 
publications, assess it and apply it to your research question. Discovering a new 
discipline can be compared to learning a new language. In the beginning, you will 
have a hard time understanding what people speaking in a foreign tongue are 
actually talking about. Gradually, after much practice and exposure, you will make 
more sense of what you hear and, finally, you will be able to speak the language 
yourself. An important lesson that can be drawn from this comparison is that getting 
to know a new discipline takes a lot of time and effort, especially if you intend to 
make use of this discipline on more than an incidental basis (that is, if your research 
corresponds with type 3, 4 or 5  in our dynamic model of interdisciplinarity). You have 
to immerse yourself in the discussions that are taking place in the field at hand. 
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Another lesson to be learned is that, although it is said that ‘practice makes perfect’, 
you should be prepared to settle for less than perfect. Good enough is still good 
enough. If you are not raised bilingually, it is very difficult to master a second 
language fully. Moreover, keep in mind that you do not have to be an expert in 
another discipline yourself to draw some useful information from it for answering your 
research question.  
In order to check whether you have understood what is said in another field, it 
advisable to ask for an expert opinion. An expert can tell you whether the way in 
which you have incorporated insights from his or her discipline in your research 
complies with the standards accepted there. However, a well-known problem with 
consulting experts is that they do not always agree with each other on minor as well 
as major issues. So how do you know which expert to choose and who can you 
trust? Since you cannot appeal to an ‘expert of experts’ (because then the same 
problem would occur: can he or she be trusted?), you have to rely on your own 
judgment. In general, it can be said that you should consult an expert who is 
generally accepted to be an authority on your research topic and whose approach 
broadly fits with your own ideas about how your research should be carried out.  
 
 
5.  Interdisciplinary Research: Choosing your approach 
 
How do you choose between different kinds of research? Depending on the type of 
questions you want to answer and your own interests and capacities, you can decide 
either to stick to traditional monodisciplinary research, possibly with heuristical or 
more substantial input from another discipline, or to adopt a comparative or an 
interdisciplinary approach. Fundamental choices and beliefs in particular with respect 
to truth, the nature of concepts, the relation between facts and values, the aims of 
scientific research (see section 3) determine the place that interdisciplinarity can 
have. In our view, taking a particular approach to the nature of science is inevitable, a 
choice which entails the extent of interdisciplinary work that fits that particular 
perspective on scientific research. However, every approach has its possibilities and 
limitations. In our concluding remarks, we will discuss briefly the main advantages of 
different types of research, as described in our dynamic model of interdisciplinary 
(section 2) and the most important challenges or risks they face.  
 (i) To begin with, monodisciplinary research into law consists in the collection, 
analysis and systematization of legal norms promulgated by the legislature and 
applied by the courts, in many cases together with an assessment thereof on the 
basis of legal or other (e.g., political, ethical, or sociological) standards. Traditionally, 
it has always been the task of the science of law to describe the content of the law in 
the past as well as in the present. Since the law changes continuously, there will 
always be enough work for this kind of monodisciplinary research. Different actors in 
society can profit from the knowledge accumulated by the science of law: from 
politicians who want to contest the legality of some draft or bill in Parliament to 
citizens who aim at enforcing their rights before the court. According to Kelsen and 
other legal positivists, legal science should limit itself to a representation of the legal 
system as it is and to an assessment of its logical consistency, because otherwise it 
would loose its distinctive character and thereby its scientific raison d’être. In 
Kelsen’s view, normative questions about what the law ought to be cannot be 
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answered scientifically, but belong to the political sphere. However, legal scholars 
who are working within a natural law or interactionist framework reject a strict 
is/ought distinction and, therefore, consider evaluation to be an integral part of legal 
science. A major advantage of a monodisciplinary approach that has been developed 
and refined over centuries is that a high level of harmonization in concepts and 
methods has been reached. Legal scholars have created a shared language to 
describe legal norms and hermeneutic tools to apply them to concrete cases. At the 
same time, when concepts and methods are largely stabilized, there is limited room 
for innovation. Innovation in the description and application of legal norms is not even 
considered to be an ideal to strive for within a traditional conception of legal science. 
Unlike the science of literature, legal science is not interested in producing the most 
creative or original interpretation of authoritative texts but in representing them in the 
most precise and accurate way. On the contrary, in order to protect the value of legal 
security, it is important that the legal system is presented as much as possible as a 
unified and univocal whole. A monodisciplinary approach to law, restricting itself to a 
representation and evaluation of the existing body of law on the basis of pre-
established concepts and methods, from a scientific point of view may not seem very 
interesting or exciting – despite all its craftsmanship. Its main purpose is not to 
innovate scientific thought, but to apply existing knowledge on new data (such as 
new developments in society or in the legal system itself).  
 (ii) More room for innovation is created when a legal scholar turns to another 
discipline in order to get inspiration. In this case, the source discipline is used as a 
heuristic device for generating new insights from which the target domain – the legal 
science – may profit. These new insights will be evaluated according to values and 
truth criteria internal to the science of law. For instance, philosophical theory may 
indicate that interpretation of legal texts is never a matter of sheer subsumption but 
always is a creative process. In order to make this insight acceptable to legal 
science, it has to be justified in terms of its internal values, such as reasonableness 
or fairness. However, legal scholars who prioritize legal security over the fore-
mentioned values will be inclined to reject this insight. Because external input is 
controlled by and mediated through internal standards, the heuristic approach has 
the same advantage as the monodisciplinary approach that it protects the unity of the 
concepts and methods used. An important weakness of the heuristic approach is, 
exactly because the external input has to be justified exclusively in internal terms, 
that the new insights are generated in a non-systematic, accidental and arbitrary 
way. Anything can be a source of inspiration to the science of law, not only other 
scientific disciplines but also novels, film or long strolls along the beach. From the 
viewpoint of legal science it does not make a difference where the insights are taken 
from or how they are discovered, as long as they can be justified in legal terms; they 
have no argumentative force on their own.  
 (iii) If a legal scholar treats the source discipline not merely as inspiration but 
as a necessary contribution to the science of law, the transfer of insights may acquire 
a more systematic and less arbitrary character. That is only possible if one considers 
the task of legal science to be more than just the representation of the legal system 
and an assessment of its internal consistency but also the development and 
improvement of the existing legal system. Otherwise, if legal scholars are seen solely 
as the bookkeepers of the law, there would be no need for external input. 
Suggestions for developing and improving the law may be taken from different 
 19
sources, for instance sociology or ethics. However, that raises the question why one 
source domain – in this case: sociology – is favoured. Moreover, the problem is how 
to assess the quality of the external input. One has to be trained in two disciplines to 
be able to take a stand in debates that take place within these disciplines. If not, one 
has to rely on authoritative sources which may unfortunately be contradictory. A final 
risk connected to the transfer of insights from one domain to the other is that the 
unity of concepts and methods used in the target domain is disturbed. For instance, 
what will happen when the economic distinction between efficient and inefficient is 
inserted into the legal vocabulary?  
 (iv) In comparative research all these risks are duplicated, because the 
transfer of insights is not one-way, as in the previous approach, but two-way: the 
disciplines involved are source and target domain at the same time. A scholar has to 
be at home in both disciplines, in order to assess the quality of the imported 
knowledge himself. The transplantation of foreign terminology into a scientific 
discourse may lead to misunderstandings (Luhmann (1991, 457). Moreover, 
problems may arise when disciplines produce contradictory insights. In other words, 
how can we secure coherence in knowledge claims in a comparative approach? At 
the same time, comparative research offers good opportunities of innovation in the 
target as well as in the source domain, if a fruitful interaction between the two can be 
established.  
 (v) Finally, an integrative approach offers the best opportunity for exchanging 
knowledge. Science is freed from artificial and arbitrary disciplinary boundaries. 
However, by transgressing boundaries, disciplines lose their distinct character and 
may become more and more identical. Moreover, in its effort to see everything from 
all sorts of perspectives at the same time, an integrative approach may end up in 
seeing nothing at all. Paradoxically, the more successful an integration of disciplines 
is, the more it resembles a monodisciplinary approach, with all its advantages and 
disadvantages.  
 Initially, we started from a dichotomy between an interdisciplinary or 
integrative approach to law and a monodisciplinary approach. By distinguishing 
different types of legal research in our dynamic model of interdisciplinarity, we create 
an opening to make this opposition less rigid. On the one hand, a monodisciplinary 
approach to law does not by necessity exclude the possibility that legal science 
profits from insights from other disciplines, if only in a heuristic way. On the other 
hand, an interdisciplinary approach that is successful in integrating knowledge from 
different sources may at some point become a discipline in its own right. With Arbib & 
Hesse (1986), we believe that a direct and ‘full’ access to reality is impossible. Our 
knowledge of the world is always mediated through some disciplinary perspective or 
other. Whether you want to adhere to one perspective or try to transcend this 
perspective by confronting it with other (sociological, ethical, historical, economical, 
rhetorical etc.) perspectives is a matter of personal choice – a choice that will depend 
on your convictions on fundamental philosophical issues.  
At the two extremes of our model of interdisciplinarity, there are two pitfalls that in our 
view need to be avoided: at the one end, the rigidity and impermeability of a strict 
monodisciplinary approach and, at the other end, too much flexibility and openness 
that may result in an undifferentiated and undifferentiating fusion and confusion of 
perspectives. Between these extremes, meaningful exchanges between different 
disciplines are possible, as will be shown in the following chapters. However, these 
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exchanges will not always be peaceful, since different disciplines will use concepts 
and methods differently, or may at first not recognize each other’s methods, and so 
on. From these clashes, new insights may spring.  
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